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Abstract: In this article, it is shown specifically that natural system
chance events as represented by theory predicted (a priori) probabilis-
tic statements used in such realms as modern particle physics, among
others, are only random relative to the restricted language of the theory
that predicts such behavior. It is shown that all such “chance” natural
events are related one to another by a remarkably designed, system-
atic and wondrous collection of equations that model how the natural
laws and processes specifically yield such natural events. A second re-
sult shows theoretically that all such “chance” behavior is caused by the
application of well-defined ultralogics. These results show specifically
that the fundamental underlying behavior associated with all natural
systems that comprise our universe is controlled internally by processes
that cannot be differentiated from those that mirror the behavior of an
infinitely powerful mind.
Before I start this article, I must make one very, very important disclosure. All
the Herrmann models mentioned and the results they predict utilize a few common
everyday human experiences that can be verified within a laboratory setting. Except
for one or more of the following principles (1) - (4) and the most basic mathematical
axioms used throughout all of science, NO additional mathematical or physical
axioms or presuppositions are assumed. This must always be kept in mind, for
there will arise the myth that the results have somehow or other been included
within the axioms or presuppositions. This myth is entirely and utterly false.
From Nobel Laureate Louis de Broglie, comes the statement:
. . . the structure of the material universe has something in
common with the laws that govern the workings of the human
mind. [March, 1963, p. 143]
In an interesting series of lectures that will be discussed more fully, Nobel Laureate
Richard Feynman tells his audience
I am describing how Nature works. (1985, p. 10)
These two statements present a rather obvious fact that should come as no sur-
prise. What Feynman and all other materialistic scientists do during their lectures
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is to describe in words, diagrams, computer images, and the like, the natural laws
and processes that they claim will lead to a natural event or a change in a nat-
ural system. For humanly comprehensible “descriptions,” as broadly defined, the
following is fully discussed in Herrmann (1994) and is denoted as Principle (1).
How nature combines together natural laws and processes to produce the
moment-to-moment “evolution” (i.e. development or changes in the be-
havior) of a natural system is modeled or mirrored by certain aspects of
human mental activity. One of the most fundamental deductive procedures that
models the development of a natural system is, itself, modeled by the “consequence”
operator. Such operators are discussed in more detail later in this article and many
interesting properties appear in Herrmann (1987). Principle (1), although clearly
restrictive and materialistic in character, is verified, relative to deductive science,
by the largest amount of empirical evidence that could ever exist since whenever
a scientist predicts natural system behavior from a collection of hypotheses deduc-
tive human mental activity is applied. This even includes the application of the
principles used to gather and analyze evidence that would tend to verify a scientific
hypothesis.
During his 1998 American tour, Stephen Hawking stated while visiting the
President at the White House that in a very few years scientists will be able to
describe all the natural laws and processes that govern the behavior of every natural
system that exists within the universe and use these laws to predict correctly such
behavior. This is the basic philosophy of science that drives many scientist. It is
immaterial whether or not the Hawking philosophy is correct for the driving force
behind basic research is that the human brain, let’s call it the mind instead, is, at
the least, capable of comprehending all the natural laws and processes that govern
the workings of our universe. Let’s call this principle (2).
I point out that during recent history principle (2) was not accepted by all
scientists. For example, Nobel Laureate Max Planck wrote that:
Nature does not allow herself to be exhaustively expressed in hu-
man thought. (1932, p. 2)
Of course, Max Planck is one of the founders of “Quantum Mechanics.” Since
(2) is not as yet established, it is better to consider (2) as but a partial statement.
Thus, we modify (2) to include the word “probably,” and accept that some of
the present day humanly constructed theories are “probably” correct predictors of
objective reality. [Philosophically, the theories themselves should be considered as
probable in character (Cohen & Nagel, 1934, p. 393).] When theories are considered,
they will be tacitly assumed to be among the ones that are “probably” correct
predictors.
In a course on Quantum Information and Computers given at Cal. Tech. by
John Preskill we are told in the textbook he wrote for the course that:
. . . fundamentally the universe is quantum mechanical. . .
. For example, clicks registered in a detector that monitors a ra-
dioactive source are described by a truly random Poisson process.
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In contrast, there is no place for true randomness in deterministic
classical dynamics (although of course a complex (chaotic) classi-
cal system can exhibit behavior that is in practice indistinguishable
from random). (Preskill, 1997, p. 4)
Principle (3) is the notion that fundamental natural system behavior is
probabilistic in character.
[A] Clearly, Preskill requires his students to take a specific stance in the phi-
losophy of science, a philosophical stance that cannot be scientifically verified in any
manner. Although there are deterministic mathematical descriptions for behavior
that cannot be distinguished from a pure statistical distribution that it is claim is
produced by the “pure” random behavior of a natural system, an individual most
not accept these deterministic models as reality. I repeat that according to Preskill
and his quantum view, you must not accept these deterministic models as mirroring
reality although there is no scientific method that can distinguish such determin-
istic design for natural system behavior from the claimed non-design displayed by
pure random behavior. Of course, we do have the very great mystery why there
is, indeed, a Poisson mathematical design being displayed when a large number of
clicks are being considered. But relative to the behavior of each individual click, we
are to believe, there is no possible intelligent relationship between the occurrence of
one click and the occurrence of the very next click. It is the seeming non-relation
between successive clicks that appears to make them “random” in character.
First, no one can truly force you to accept this philosophy. You can study
chaos theory and other mathematical areas and accept that there are deterministic
and highly designed natural world processes being modeled by the mathematics
and these natural world processes only give the appearance of random behavior.
Of course, I suppose that you would not voice you opinion while a student in such
courses at Cal. Tech. But more importantly, does the basic idea of “random” imply
lack of design? Further, is the apparent random character of quantum mechanics
the true underlying feature that describes natural system behavior at all levels of
human comprehension?
The particle physicists claim that all natural system behavior is fundamentally
controlled by the “invisible” and individually undetectable entities that abound
within the realm of quantum physics and, especially, within an nonempty back-
ground that is called the “vacuum.” The major evidence that such entities might
exist in objective reality is that various theories predict that under certain hypothe-
ses gross matter, that can be detected by a machine or a human sensor, will behavior
in a certain way. This is called indirect evidence. But the entities being described
need only be objects within an analog model, a collection of fictitious entities that
are used solely to aid the human mind to comprehend and describe processes that
will predict an experimental outcome although the entities and processes need not
exist in objective reality.
Many times the subatomic entities start out as imaginary. In the original
paper Einstein wrote where he gives his model for the photoelectric effect, he called
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the photon an “imaginary” particle-like entity. But, Richard Feynman in his book
“QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter” (1985) insists that light particles
exist in objective reality. However, in this same book in order to explain partial
reflection Feynman states relative to the direction of an arrow that will measure a
probability:
To determine the direction of each arrow, let’s imagine that we have
a stopwatch that can time a photon as it moves. This imaginary
stopwatch has a single hand that turns around very, very rapidly.
When a photon leaves a source, we start the stopwatch. As long
as the photon moves, the stopwatch hand turns . . . ; when the
photon ends up at the photomultiplier, we stop the watch. The
hand ends up pointing in a certain direction. This is the direction
we will draw the arrow. (Feynman, 1985, p. 27.)
I point out that not only is the stopwatch imaginary, at least at the present
time, but the vectors, the arrows, also do not exist in objective reality. Such de-
scriptions form but an analog model for such behavior and nothing more than that.
Indeed, many physicists in this area of QED use such phrases as “a photon is ab-
sorbed” or “emitted by an electron” without ever considering any description as
to how an “electron” absorbs or emits anything. An assumed process such as the
directly unobserved interaction between a photon and an electron is an essential
part of this QED theory. But, not withstanding these obvious logical faults, I will
consider as another principle of modern science, principle (4), the principle of
indirect verification as fundamental to modern research. This principle states
that if assuming the existence of undetectable entities or processes yields correct
predictions for the behavior of gross matter, then these entities or processes should
be assumed to exist in objective reality. Of course, principle (4) immediately im-
plies that principle (1) is empirical fact. Also note that from a theoretical point of
view, the fewer hypotheses a scientist employs as a bases for a theory, the better
the theory is said to be.
Assuming principle (2) and (4), human beings describe laws and processes of
nature as part of human theories and predict correctly from these theories nat-
ural system behavior, even if all such predictions are probabilistic in character.
Consequently, the following must hold. Let Γ be a set of hypotheses of such a the-
ory. The Γ need not contain all of the natural laws or processes that will lead to
a prediction, but need only contain a description for the physical entities to which
these natural laws or processes will be applied. Then the human brain takes Γ and
preforms upon Γ some sort of mental process that yields a prediction P . This pre-
diction is then verified in the laboratory or, similar to the Big Bang cosmology, is
assumed to have occured sometime in the past. These, at present, unknown human
mental processes are indicated by the turnstile symbol ⊢ . If Γ does not contain all
of the applicable natural laws or processes, then these laws or processes become part
of the human mental process symbolized by ⊢ . In either case, this simple sequence
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of events is symbolized by
Γ ⊢ P. [1]
In all that comes next, the fundamental hypotheses will include the previously
mentioned four principles. These principles are re-stated as follows:
(1) How nature combines together natural laws and processes to
produce the moment-to-moment “evolutio” (i.e. development or
changes in the behavior) of a natural system is modeled or mirrored
by certain aspects of human mental activity.
(2) Some of the present day humanly constructed theories are
“probably” correct predictors of objective reality. When theories
are considered, they will be tacitly assumed to be among the ones
that are “probably” correct predictors.
(3) Predictions of correct fundamental natural system behavior will
always require the behavior to be associated with a statistical state-
ment that implies that natural system behavior originates from
behavior that is always probabilistic in character.
(4) Although natural entities and processes described by means of a
language using “physical” terms may not be observed directly, they
will be considered as existing in objective reality if their continued
use yields correct predictions.
It is self-evident that according to the principle (2) that [1] displays an ab-
solute fundamental process that occurs within the human brain. Expression [1]
corresponds to principle (1) in that it displays a fundamental relationship between
human mental processes and natural system behavior. Expression [1] and the next
expression [2] can also be related to the informational content of a theory and
Preskill claims that information is “physical” (Preskill, 1997, p. 4) in character.
Mathematicians study patterns associated with human mental activity in various
ways. There are general properties associated with these mental patterns and these
mental properties can be modeled by means of a mathematical object called a
consequence operator C rather than the turnstile ⊢ . Relative to a consequence
operator the turnstile relation becomes
P ∈ C(Γ). [2]
Expression [2] displays, in the simplest possible manner, the possible existence
of a natural process that is being mirrored by the properties of operator C. Since the
consequence operator properties are fundamental to all physical science theory and
principle (2) states that some of the probably correct humanly generated theories
are known and these theories predict the behavior of natural systems within the
universe, then using principle (4) we should accept that it is absolutely true in
objective reality that the behavior of operator C is mirroring the most fundamental
of all natural processes.
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One of the major characteristics of a modern scientific community is that it
is exceptional myopic when it deals with scientific theory. A scientist learns and
then concentrates upon a very complex often mathematically based theory and
predicts verified results. But, usually, the scientist cannot step back and observe
the actual essence of what has been accomplished through such efforts. What is
actually happening in nature itself is almost always hidden among thousands of
pages of symbolic representations. This also happens when mathematicians study
the patterns presented by consequence operators as a model for what, using principle
(1), must be natural processes.
A consequence operator is defined upon all of the subsets of a language L
and L can be very broad in character and not only include the ordinary strings of
symbols one associates with a language such as those strings displayed in this article
but can include audio and visual impressions as well. You need not start with a
turnstile operator ⊢ as your basic operator. It has been customary to include
in the Γ statements for all of the theoretical aspects that the human mind uses
to predict an output event that should occur when a describable natural system
input is being considered. For example, the natural input for radioactive decay is
the presence of a “decaying” radioactive material. It should be possible to apply
certain general natural laws and processes that explain such decay and, of course,
application of human mental processes, and predict the probability, with respect to
time intervals, of the occurrence of the detector “clicks.” Then as another example,
using the Feynman described theory for partial reflection, the actual source is a
“photon generator” and the detectors are photomultipliers. As Feynman states it
on page 17 of the above mentioned book, QED will predict that for a glass surface
and a supply of photons of a fixed frequency, say red light, on the average 4% of the
photons out of 100 photons will be reflected by the surface at a specific angle and
be counted by a specially placed photomultiplier. The input or trials are the 100
photons emitted from the source and the output events are the 4 photons detected
by the photomultiplier. However, as mentioned, one need only consider Γ, for the
radioactive case, as a single description for the radioactive material, and, for the
photon case, a description for the photon source.
With respect to these event predictions, the essence of the concept of random
is that the occurrence of one of these events has no influence upon the occurences
of the “next event.” (Olkin, et al. 1994, p. 7.) The basic problem is what does
the phrase “no influence” mean. One of the aspects of the new material to be
presented is that the phrase “no influence” does not mean no design. Further, it
will be shown that the phrase “no influence” relative to predictions produce by
any physical theory means [B] no influence that can be described using the
theory’s restricted language (Theory Randomness), with the exception of
trivial identity styled relations. But, although principle (2) is used by most scientists
to mean “no influence” by means of any natural law or process, which is the concept
called absolute randomness, we will show that there is no such scientific concept
as absolute randomness. Indeed, absolute randomness is a false statement. We will
show that the myopia of the scientific community has prevented it from “seeing,”
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so to speak, the actual wondrous design and the actual basic event influences that
most be present before any so-called random events can occur.
In explaining the following new research findings, certain philosophical state-
ments made by Feynman will be upheld. Relative to theoretic constructs, Feynman
writes:
The . . . reason that you might not understand what I am telling
you is, while I am describing how Nature works, you won’t under-
stand why Nature works that way. But you see, nobody understand
that. (1985, p. 10)
From my experience, another aspect of the Feynman philosophy is perfectly correct
with the exception of, at the least, one of notable research discovery.
Finally, there is the possibility: after I tell you something, you just
can’t believe it. You can’t accept it. A little screen comes down
and you don’t listen anymore. I’m going to describe to you how
Nature is – and if you don’t like it, that’s going to get in the way of
your understanding it. It’s a problem that physicists have learned
to deal with: They’ve learned to realize whether they like a theory
or they don’t like a theory is not the essential question. Rather,
it is whether or not the theory gives predictions that agree with
experiment. It is not a question of whether a theory is philosophical
delightful, or easy to understand, or perfectly reasonable . . . .
(1985, p. 10)
The notable exception is a theory of everything (Herrmann, 1994) that
solves the General Grand Unification problem. This theory uses processes that
satisfy, in general, principles (1), (4), and since it predicts the behavior of all of
the natural systems that exist within our universe, it should, by principle (4), be
accepted by all of the scientific community. In general, the model shows, with
respect to principle (4), that our universe was created by processes that mirror
the processes one would associate with an infinitely powerful mind. The model
is called the MA-model and uses the processes and concepts associated with a
mathematical entity called the Nonstandard Physical World which also, according
to principle (4), should be accepted as existing in objective reality. The fact that
most of the scientific community rejects this model is a counterexample to the last
sentence in the above Feynman quotation. Since the MA-model does depend upon
the existence of a “background” or “substratum” universe that is the domain for
the universe creating operators, then, counter to principle (4) and the Feynman
statement, this model is further rejected based upon the philosophical stance that
no such undetectable substratum exists. However, postulating away the existence
of such a background universe is not sufficient in order to eliminate the conclusion
that natural systems within our universe are, indeed, controlled by processes that
mirror exceptionally remarkable and wondrous mental processes.
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As final re-enforcements to the above four principles, where I have added re-
marks between the [ and ], Feynman states:
I am not going to explain how the photons actually “decide” when
to bounce back or go through: this is not known . . . . I will
only show you how to calculate the correct [Indeed, as perfect as
one wishes] probability that light will be reflected from the glass
of a given thickness, because that’s the only thing physicists know
how to do! What we do to get the correct answer to this problem
is analogous to the things we have to do to get the answers to
every other problem explained by quantum electrodynamics [QED].
(1985, p. 24)
The theory [QED] describes all of the phenomena of the physical
world except the gravitational effects . . . and radioactive phenom-
ena [nuclear physics] . . . [ Note: recent research tends to uphold
the original Hawking principle in that procedures similar to those
used for QED seem to predict some gravitational and many nu-
clear effects.] Most phenomena we are familiar with involve such
tremendous numbers of electrons that it’s hard for our poor minds
to follow that complexity. [But, in theory, a computer, which fol-
lows the specific logical rules of the propositional logic, should be
able to make such calculations.] (1985, p. 7-8)
The following discussion and results, although applicable to various physical
scenarios, are being restricted to the realm of “particle physics.” All probability
statements can be re-expressed in terms of the number n of describable trials and
specific describable natural events A that can occur during these specific trials.
Since all of these theories use mathematical procedures to predict a probability p,
the basic requirement for a probability statement is that the trials form a random
sequence under a given set of conditions. If during the n trials, where n is a large
number of trials, m events A occur, then the event A occurs with a probability
p approximated by m/n. The approximation becomes more certain as the number
of trials increases “without limit.” With the exception that one might claim, as
Preskill has done, that certain events seem to follow a mathematical distribution,
the “random sequence” statement cannot be established within a laboratory setting
with certainty. As pointed out in the dictionary by James and James (1968, p. 285
p. 307), such definitions have either logical or empirical difficulties.
Of course, any description for the source that produces the trials, the trials
themselves and a description for the events requires a specific scientific language.
Note that some trial descriptions are solely relative to “time.” One calculates that
over certain time intervals the probability that the detector will click is such and
such. On the other hand, you might have a collection of different events that can
be described in the appropriate language. For example, suppose that out of 100
photons the probability that they will be “reflected” at the measured angle is 0.40
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(i.e. event A occurs) and the probability that they will be “scattered” or not
reflected at the measured angle is 0.96 (i.e. event A does not occur). Each trial
n and each event produced by a trial must correspond to some sort of “counting
label” or else you would have no such probability statement.
Since mental activity is used to predict probability notions, the n trials can
be modeled by means of n very simple consequence operators, one for each of the
counting labels and the n possible outcomes, of which m are the A events. Let Γ
be a description for the source such as “A photon from S.” Let each b ∈ B, where
|B| ≥ 2, correspond to a description for the event outcome produced by each of the
n trials. There needs to be n applications of a mentally produced statement such
as “Γ yields a member of B.” In the case of A events, m of these trials correspond
to a fixed b ∈ B that describes the A events. Using a power set map, the following
set of statements model the essence of this probabilistic scenario, where for each i
such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is some b ∈ B such that b = ai.
a1 ∈ H1({Γ}), · · · , an ∈ Hn({Γ}), [3]
where the counting label is represented by the n applications of the operator H (as
denoted by the H1, . . . , Hn symbols) as H is associated with the labeled a1, . . . , an
events.
In order to indicate the intuitive ordering of any sequence of events, the set
T of Kleene styled “tick” marks is used (Kleene, 1967, p. 202) as they might
be metamathematically abbreviated by symbols for the non-zero natural numbers.
Using the philosophy of science concept of simplicity, assume that our language
L = {Γ} ∪ B ∪ T. In 1987, it was discovered that there exists a set of consequence
operators
C = {Ci = C({ai}, {Γ}) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, [4]
that satisfies the requirements of [3] and is minimal with respect to L and [3] (the Oc-
cam Razor requirement). (Herrmann, 1987, p. 2, Definition 2.4 (i). Note: This 1987
paper, unfortunately, contains numerous topographical printers errors.) Further, in
order to maintain the requirement and, hence, prediction that [C] no two or
more of the trial events b be in a recognizable order (an aspect of the-
ory randomness), principle (1) requires that any two or more members of C in
expression [4], when combined together, be a simple type of consequence opera-
tor such that the corresponding event outputs of this combination maintain this
requirement. The appropriate combination that is absolutely necessary is called
the union consequence operator and is denoted by C′ = C1 ∨ C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn (i.e.
C′(X) = C1(X) ∪ · · · ∪ Cn(X)). The union consequence operator does not usually
exist, but in the case of the set of operators in C such an operator defined on L
does exist and is minimal in the sense of it being the weakest consequence opera-
tor (mental activity) that is stranger than each Ci and, hence, satisfies the Occam
Razor requirement for models (Herrmann, 1987, p. 5). Such consequence operators
are the most simplistic entities one can use to model the actual mental processes
that yield the probabilistic predictions.
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There is another minimal mental-like operator that would be applied after each
Ci. In human communication, one of the most significant processes is the selection
from a vast collection of words and phrases a particular collection that faithfully
describes an event. This operator is called the finite human choice operator. This
operator mirrors the natural process known as the realism operator and might be
considered as a slight generalization of the natural selection operator used through-
out evolutionary theories. However, this operator is usually considered as but an
integral part of each Ci. This operator, denoted by R, is restricted to members of C as
they are applied to {Γ} and such operators as C′. Define R(C({Γ}) = C({Γ})−{Γ}.
This yields for each (trial) R(Ci({Γ})) = {ai} and R(C
′({Γ}) = B.
A source Γ1 can have numerous associated but different Bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, A
described events probabilistically predicted by a specific theory. For example, simply
consider the source as sun-light. Again these probabilistic predictions correspond
to a set of consequence operators C1 each defined on a language L1 = {Γ1} ∪ B1 ∪
B2∪· · ·∪Bk∪T. Again these consequence operators must satisfy the union operator
requirement. The simplest set of such consequence operators that contains C1 and
satisfies the union operator property forms one of the most wondrous and beautifully
designed of all mathematical objects: it is a complete distributive lattice of finitary
consequence operators (Herrmann, 1987, p. 5). [For reference purposes, the set is
C2 = {C(X, {Γ1}) | X ⊂ L1}, where if Γ1 ∈ Y, then C(X, {Γ1})(Y ) = Y ∪ X ; if
Γ1 /∈ Y, then C(X, {Γ1})(Y ) = Y.]
Usually, the probability statement is considered to be more accurate only if
you increase the number of trials n without limit (i. e. n→∞). In order to avoid
the philosophical difficulties one might have with the “infinity” concept, one can
use the “potential” infinite notion. In this case, one can describe this process by
saying, “Pick any natural number you wish, then the necessary number of trials for
an accurate prediction is greater than your choice.” The conclusion that the set of
all such consequence operators has this remarkable mathematical property is not
dependent upon the number of trials.
Such sets of consequence operators have a much more startling property, how-
ever. Any set of consequence operators such as those in [4] and that satisfies the
requirement that C′ is a consequence operator are related one to another. In the
appendix is a new nontrivial result that shows that for any nonempty set of conse-
quence operators {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 < n}, each of which is defined on a language L
and for which C′ is a consequence operator defined on L, it follows that
C1(C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn) = C2(C1 ∨ C3 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn) = · · ·
Cn−1(C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn−2 ∨ Cn) = Cn(C1 ∨ C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn−1). [5]
Although, there may not be a relation between individual events ai that can be
described in terms of the restricted language used for the predictive physical theory,
there is the relation [5] between each of the individual operators described above for
a probabilistic model and that are needed to predict each ai. Using principle (1),
the consequence operators Ci correspond to natural processes that combine together
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the theory dependent natural laws or processes in order to predict the probabilistic
statement. Hence, the natural processes modeled by the Ci are individually re-
lated by the n(n − 1)/2 equations that appear in [5]. Expression [5] is what one
might describe as being in a symmetric form. But, actually, there are many more
such equations since the operator ∨ is commutative and, hence, any permutation
of the operators between the ( and ) will also lead to many more such equations.
Consequently, the events ai that are produced by the necessary consequence opera-
tors Ci are not absolutely random in character when the processes are described by
the theory of consequence operators. This also indicates that the actual concept of
“randomness” should be considered as only relative to the original theory restricted
language that predicts the probabilistic statement.
It is self-evident from paragraph [A] on page 2, the theory randomness state-
ment [B] on page 6, and statement [C] relative to recognizable order on page 9 that
such “randomness” need not be considered as a hypothesis within such probabilis-
tic theories as QED. Indeed, theory randomness is a statement about and, hence,
exterior to such theories and as such is a statement within the employed philosophy
of science. For this reason, expression [5] is falsifiable. For if it can be demonstrated
that [C] is false, then this will falsify the expression [5].
Conclusions
As mentioned, the MA-model shows that it is rational to assume that an ex-
ternal mental-like consequence operator and an external object that behaves like an
actual collection of symbols, a word, are the underlying entities that produce and
sustain not only our universe in its evolutionary development but can be used to
create and sustain other “universes” as well. The particle physics community tends
to accept the original Hawking principle, especially since their contention is that it is
the probabilistic rules and processes of quantum physics that will be shown, shortly,
to govern completely the four fundamental interactions produced by what are often
called the electromagnetic, strong, weak, and gravitational “forces.” Due to the
often stated requirement that probabilities be considered as related to potentially
infinitely many trials, many would consider the n that appears in displays [4], [5] to
be potentially infinite in character. Notwithstanding this last possible requirement,
since the n mental-like consequence operators that appear in [4] and [5] must apply
to every predictive quantum physical scenario in the vicinity of every spacetime
location throughout our universe, as assumed by particle physics, then the funda-
mental behavior that governs our universe can be described, in general, in the exact
same terms as those used to describe the MA-model conclusions. Consequently,
it appears that the fundamental underlying behavior associated with all natural
systems that comprise our universe is controlled internally by processes that mirror
the behavior of an infinitely powerful mind.
The research result Theorem 2, in the appendix, gives a very significant addi-
tional result relative to the infinitely powerful mind concept. Relative to quantum
physical behavior of photons and partial reflection as QED predicates the probabil-
ity that an event will occur, Feynman writes:
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I am not going to explain how the photons actually ”decide”
whether to bounce back or go through; that is not known. (Prob-
ably the question has no meaning.) (1985, p. 24)
Feynman uses at this point in his lecture the terms “bounce back” and “go
through” for what he later terms as new photons (emitted from electrons) and that
reach the detector or photons that are “scattered” by electrons. The probability
that an observed event will occur depends upon the combined probability that
a set of individual events will occur. Since natural systems are also controlled, in
general, by ultrawords, it would be the ultranatural events and ultrawords that
force the individual probabilities to combine in the appropriate manner that would
be described as quantum physical “natural law.” Consequently, this combined
probability depends upon the probability that a describable individual event E will
occur.
The above Feynman statement may, indeed, be correct for the language of QED
and quantum mechanics in general, but it is a false statement relative to the theory
of ultralogics and the physical-like behavior of ultralogics. Relative to theory pre-
dicted probabilistic behavior, Theorem 2, in the appendix, shows explicitly that for
any sequence of relative frequencies m/n that converges to a predicted probability
p that an individual event will occur, whether the convergence be fast or slow, there
is a physical-like ultralogic that does, indeed, force the event to occur or not to
occur in such a manner that the relative frequence sequence is duplicated exactly.
Accept for satisfying the basic consequence operator properties for what are called
internal sets, it is significantly, that the ultralogic Pp that forces a specific natural
system to so comply with such a probabilistic pattern is not related to any known
human deductive process.
Preskill’s (1997, p. 4) quoted remark is about a probability distribution, the
Poisson distribution. The facts are that all such distributions that are obtained
from a frequency function follow patterns dictated by an ultralogic generated by
a finite set of ultralogics Pp(i). Relative to Theorem 2, the only difference is that
the “source” statement Γ maybe more complex in that it describes a particular
physical scenario and the “event” statemens in B may also be more complex. Under
the view that equivalent descriptions represented by Γ and members of B contain
all the necessary information that depicts natural-system behavior for a particular
physical scenario, then a frequency function f(x) is used to obtain the probability
that the scenario will occur. A product consequence operator (an ultralogic) is
generated by finitely many of the Pp that appear in Theorem 2 and yields the
appropriate sequence of events that satisfies the required distribution.
Using these event sequence ultralogics, one would conclude that the so-called
“unregulated or random” behavior that one often associates with quantum me-
chanics and the behavior of entities within our universe is actually one of the most
powerful signatures that processes represented by an infinitely powerful mind de-
scription are controlling all aspects of natural system behavior.
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Appendix
Prior to presenting the major mathematical results, one technical aspect for
such modeling needs to be explored. This aspect was assumed to be self-evident in
some of the previous Herrmann articles written on this subject. However, this “self-
evidence” will now be further detailed. Different informal (i.e. native) languages use
different discipline dictionaries as well as different syntactic rules. In formal logic,
the same symbols and same syntactic rules yield different strings of symbols that are
said to be “logically equivalent.” Throughout various deductive arguments logically
equivalent strings of symbols can be substituted, one for another, and the logical
argument remains valid. This type of equivalence is defined in a strict and not
controversial manner. Types of equivalence are necessary when informal language
descriptions are used. However, a definition as to the equivalence of different native
language strings of symbols is necessarily more intuitive in character.
First note that to comprehend properly a set of symbol strings that contains
more than one string of symbols it is usually required that the strings to be presented
in a specific order. When necessary, the use of a spacing and punctuation symbols
would allow any finite set of such symbol strings to be considered as a set that
contains but one string of symbols. However, even under a single symbol string
notion, various types of equivalence are required for informal language descriptions.
Intuitively, this equivalence is captured within the statement that “two strings of
symbols are saying the same thing or have the same relative meaning.” It
is necessary that a form of mental activity and general consensus be considered in
order to come to this conclusion. Whatever technique is used for this purpose, such
a concept appears to have universal acceptance or else it would not be possible to
“translate” efficiently from one native language to another and ever hope to achieve
the same intended results being communicated by two different strings of symbols.
Of course, the same idea of equivalent symbol strings would hold within a specific
meaningful language as well.
The set of all “equivalent” strings of symbols taken from the language and that
have been adjudged to be “saying the same thing” is an equivalence class. Distinct
equivalence classes are disjoint, that is they have no members in common, and every
member of the language is contained in some equivalence class. The self-evident
notion previous made but not explicitly stated is that the actual set that determines
the domain and codomain for our consequence operators is a set composed of one
and only one member, a representative, from each of these equivalence classes. When
dealing with descriptions using a native language, this procedure is tacitly assumed.
Let L be a nonempty language and P denote the power set operator. A mapping
C:P(L) → P(L) is a general consequence operator if for each X ∈ P(L) (1) X ⊂
C(X), (2) C(C(X)) = C(X). (3) If X, Y ∈ P(L) and X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y ).
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THEOREM 1. Let C be the set of all consequence operators defined on L.
Let C1, · · ·Cn ∈ C, n > 1, and, for each X ⊂ L, let (C1 ∨ C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn)(X) =
(
∨n
i=1Ci)(X) =
⋃n
i=1 Ci(X). If
∨n
i=1 Ci ∈ C, then
Ci(
∨
j∈{1,...,n}−{i}
Cj) = Ck(
∨
j∈{1,...,n}−{k}
Cj), 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n
.
Proof. Define for each X ⊂ L, (
∨n
i=1 Ci)(X) = C1(X) ∪ · · · ∪ Cn(X). Notice
that
∨n
i=1Ci is a mapping on the power set of L into the power set of L and
satisfies axioms 1 and 3 for consequence operators. Two auxiliary results need to
be established using our three axioms.
Suppose that X, Y ⊂ L and C ∈ C. From axiom 1, we have that X ∪ Y ⊂
X ∪ C(Y ) ⊂ C(X) ∪ C(Y ). Application of axiom 3, yields that [1] C(X ∪ Y ) ⊂
C(X ∪C(Y )) ⊂ C(C(X)∪C(Y )). Since X ⊂ X ∪Y and Y ⊂ X ∪Y , axiom 3 yields
that C(X) ⊂ C(X∪Y ), C(Y ) ⊂ C(X∪Y ). Consequently, C(X)∪C(Y ) ⊂ C(X∪Y ).
Applying axiom 2, it follows that [2] C(C(X)∪C(Y )) ⊂ C(C(X ∪Y )) = C(X ∪Y ).
It follows from [1] and [2] that [3] C(X ∪ Y ) = C(X ∪ C(Y )) = C(C(X) ∪ C(Y )).
For a given C ∈ C, a Y ⊂ L is called a C-system if and only if C(Y ) ⊂ Y,
which is equivalent to C(Y ) = Y. Note that for any consequence operator C ∈ C, L
is a C-system. Let S(C) be the nonempty set of all C-systems for a given C ∈ C.
Suppose that [4] ∅ 6= A ⊂ S(C) and [5] X =
⋂
{Y | Y ∈ A}. Let arbitrary Y ∈ A.
Then C(Y ) ⊂ Y. But fixed X ⊂ Y implies that C(X) ⊂ C(Y ), which implies that
C(X) ⊂
⋂
{C(Y ) | Y ∈ A} =
⋂
{Y | Y ∈ A} = X. Hence [6] X ∈ S(C).
For C1, C2 ∈ C define C1 ≤ C2 if and only if for each X ∈ L, C1(X) ⊂ C2(X).
The binary relation ≤ is a partial order on L. The algebra 〈C,≤〉, along with
other objects and relations is shown by Wo´jcicki (1970) to be a complete lat-
tice. Our interest is in the structure of the least upper bound (the supremum)
C0 for the Ci ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , n. As shown by Wo´jcicki (1970, p. 276) for any
X ⊂ L, C0(X) = YX =
⋂
{Y ⊂ L | X ⊂ Y = C1(Y ) = C2(Y ) = · · ·Cn(Y )}.
Thus the YX is by [6] a Ci-system i = 1, . . . n. Indeed, intuitively the small-
est (with respect to ⊂) such common C-system. Now X ⊂ YX implies that
X ⊂ Ci(X) ⊂ Ci(YX) = YX , i = 1, . . . , n. Consequently, (
∨n
i=1 Ci)(X) ⊂ YX .
Further, Ci(X) ⊂ C1(X) ∪ · · · ∪ Cn(X), i = 1, . . . , n. Assume that
∨n
i=1 Ci ∈
C. First, notice that Ci ≤
∨n
i=1 Ci, i = 1, . . . , n, and
∨n
i=1 Ci ≤ C0. Thus∨n
i=1 Ci = C0 and satisfies axiom 2. This implies that for arbitrary X ⊂
L, (
∨n
i=1 Ci)(X) = YX = C1(YX) = C2(YX) = · · · = Cn(YX) by [6]. Therefore, the
composition (Ci(
∨n
i=1Ci))(X) = Ci(YX) = Ck(YX) = (Ck(
∨n
i=1 Ci))(X), 1 ≤
i, k ≤ n. From [3], for each i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (Ci(
∨n
i=1 Ci))(X) =
Ci(
⋃n
i=1 Ci(X)) = Ci(X ∪ (
⋃
j∈{1,...,n}−{i} Cj(X))) = Ci(
⋃
j∈{1,...,n}−{i} Cj(X)) =
(Ci(
∨
j∈{1,...,n}−{i}Cj))(X), since X ⊂
⋃
j∈{1,...,n}−{i}Cj(X), and the result fol-
lows.
[Theorem 1 also holds for any set of finitary consequence operators defined on
L. by Herrmann (2003).]
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In what follows, although this is not necessary, we will be more specific and
restrict our attention to the sets and objects discussed within the main body of this
paper. Moreover, any new terminology is taken from Herrmann (1993).
THEOREM 2. For the language L and any p ∈ IR such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where
p represents a theory predicted (i.e. a priori) probability that an event will occur.
There exists choice function C and an ultralogic Pp with the following properties.
1. When Pp is applied to {G}, G = Γ, a hyperfinite set of events
{a1, . . . , an, . . . ,
∗aν} is obtained such that for any “n” trials, {a1, · · · , an} is a finite
identified event sequence, where each ai satisfies the labeled event statement E or
labeled non-event statement E′ predictions.
2. The predictions in 1 are sequentially determine by C, where C determines a
sequence gap of relative frequencies that converges to p as the events are directly or
indirectly experimentally verified.
3. The sequence of relative frequencies gap determined by C gives the appearance
of theory dependent random chance.
Proof. All of the objects discussed will be members of an informal superstructure at
a rather low level and slightly abbreviated definitions, as also discussed in Herrmann
(1993, p. 23, 30-31), are utilized. As usual IN is the set of all natural numbers
including zero, and IN>0 the set of all non-zero natural numbers.
Let A = {a | (a: IN>0 → IN) ∧ (∀n(n ∈ IN>0 → (a(1) ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ a(n + 1) −
a(n) ≤ 1)))}. Note that the special sequences in A are non-decreasing and for each
n ∈ IN>0, a(n) ≤ n. Obviously A 6= ∅, for the basic example to be used below,
consider the sequence a(1) = 0, a(2) = 1, a(3) = 1, a(4) = 2, a(5) = 2, a(6) =
3, a(7) = 3, a(8) = 4, . . . which is a member of A. Next consider the must basic
representation Q for the non-negative rational numbers where we do not consider
them as equivalence classes. Thus Q = {(n,m) | (m ∈ IN) ∧ (n ∈ IN>0)}.
For each member of A, consider the sequence ga: IN → Q defined by ga(n) =
(n, a(n)). Let F be the set of all such ga as a ∈ A. Consider from the above
hypotheses, any p ∈ IR such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. We show that for any such p there
exists an a ∈ A and a gap ∈ F such that limn→∞ gap(n) = p. For each n ∈ IN>0,
consider n subdivision of [0, 1], and the corresponding intervals [ck, ck+1), where
ck+1 − ck = 1/n, 0 ≤ k < n, and c0 = 0, cn = 1. If p = 0, let a(n) = 0
for each n ∈ IN>0. Otherwise, using the customary covering argument relative to
such intervals, the number p is a member of one and only one of these intervals,
for each n ∈ IN>0. Hence for each such n > 0, select the end point ck of the
unique interval [ck, ck+1) that contains p. Notice that for n = 1, ck = c0 = 0.
For each such selection, let a(n) = k. Using this inductive styled definition for the
sequence a, it is immediate, from a simple induction proof, that a ∈ A, gap ∈ F, and
that limn→∞ gap(n) = p. For example, consider the basic example a above. Then
gap = {(1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 3), (7, 3), (8, 4), . . .} is such a sequence that
converges to 1/2. Let nonempty Fp ⊂ F be the set of all such gap. Note that for
the set Fp, p is fixed and Fp contains each gap, as a varies over A, that satisfies the
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convergence requirement. Thus, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, A is partitioned into subsets Ap and
a single set A′ such that each member of Ap determines a gap ∈ Fp. The elements
of A′ are the members of A that are not so characterized by such a p. Let A denote
this set of partitions.
Let B = {f | ∀n∀m(((n ∈ IN>0) ∧ (m ∈ IN) ∧ (m ≤ n))→ ((f : ([1, n]× {n}) ×
{m} → {0, 1})∧(∀j(((j ∈ IN>0)∧(1 ≤ j ≤ n))→ (
∑n
j=1 f(((j, n), n), m) = m)))))}.
The members of B are determined, but not uniquely, by each (n,m) such that
(n ∈ IN>0) ∧ (m ∈ IN) ∧ (m ≤ n). Hence for each such (n,m), let fnm ∈ B denote a
member of B that satisfies the conditions for a specific (n,m).
For a given p, by application of the axiom of choice, with respect to A, there is
an a ∈ Ap and a gap with the properties discussed above. Also there is a sequence
fna(n) of partial sequences such that, when n > 1, it follows that (†) fna(n)(j) =
f(n−1)a(n−1)(j) as 1 ≤ j ≤ (n − 1). Relative to the above example, consider the
following:
f1a(1)(1) = 0,
f2a(2)(1) = 0, f2a(2)(2) = 1,
f3a(3)(1) = 0, f3a(3)(2) = 1, f3a(3)(3) = 0,
f4a(4)(1) = 0, f4a(4)(2) = 1, f4a(4)(3) = 0, f4a(4)(4) = 1,
f5a(5)(1) = 0, f5a(5)(2) = 1, f5a(5)(3) = 0, f5a(5)(4) = 1, f5a(5)(5) = 0, · · ·
It is obvious how this unique sequence of partial sequences is obtained from any
a ∈ A. For each a ∈ A, let Ba = {fnm | ∀n(n ∈ IN>0 → m = a(n))}. Let B
†
a ⊂ Ba
such that each fnm ∈ B
†
a satisfies the partial sequence requirement (†). For each
n ∈ IN>0, let Pfna(n) ∈ B
†
a denote the unique partial sequence of n terms generated
by an a and the (†) requirement. In general, as will be demonstrated below, it is
the Pfna(n) that yields the set of consequence operators as they are defined on L or
L1 and as generated by expression [4]. Consider an additional map M from the set
PF = {Pfna(n) | a ∈ A} of these partial sequences into our descriptive language L
for the source G and an event (i.e. the ai of expression [4]). For each n ∈ IN>0, and
1 ≤ j ≤ n, if Pfna(n)(j) = 0, thenM(Pfna(n)(j)) = E
′ (i.e. E′ = E does not occur);
if Pfna(n)(j) = 1, then M(Pfna(n)(j)) = E (i.e. E does occur), as 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where
the partial sequence j = 1, · · · , n models the intuitive concept of an event sequence
(Herrmann, 1994) in such a manner that each E or E′ contains the appropriate
Kleene “tick” symbols or natural number symbols that are an abbreviation for this
tick notation.
Consider the set of consequence operators, each defined on L, H = {C(X, {G}) |
X ⊂ L}, where if G ∈ Y, then C(X, {G})(Y ) = Y ∪ X ; if G /∈ Y, then
C(X, {G})(Y ) = Y. Then for each a ∈ Ap, n ∈ IN>0 and the respective Pfna(n),
there exists the set of consequence operators Cap = {C({M(Pna(n)(j))}, {G}) |
1 ≤ j ≤ n} ⊂ H. Note that from Herrmann (1987, p. 5), H is closed un-
der the finite ∨ and the actual consequence operator is C({M(Pna(n)(1))} ∪ · · · ∪
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{M(Pna(n)(n))}, {G}). Applying the realism relation to C({M(Pna(n)(1))} ∪ · · · ∪
{M(Pna(n)(n))}, {G})({G}) yields the actual labeled or identified event partial se-
quence {M(Pna(n)(1)), . . . ,M(Pna(n)(n))}.
Now imbed the above intuitive results into the superstructure M = 〈N ,∈,=〉
which is further imbedded into the nonstandard structure ∗M = 〈 ∗N ,∈,=〉
(Herrmann, 1993). Let p ∈ IR be such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where p represents a theory
predicted (i.e. a priori) probability that an event will occur. Applying the a choice
function C to A, there is some a ∈ Ap such that gap → p. Hence let ν ∈
∗
IN
be any infinite natural number. The hyperfinite sequence {a1, . . . , an, . . . , ∗aν}
exists and corresponds to {a1, . . . , an} for any natural number n ∈ IN
>0. Also
we know that st( ∗aµ) = p for any infinite natural number µ. Thus there exists
some internal hyperfinite Pfν∗a(ν) ∈
∗PF with the *-transferred properties men-
tioned above. Since ∗H is closed under hyperfinite ∨, there is a Pp ∈ ∗H such
that, after application of the relation ∗R, the result is the hyperfinite sequence
S = {∗M(Pν∗a(ν)(1)), . . . ,
∗M(Pν∗a(ν)(j)), . . . ,
∗M(Pν∗a(ν)(ν))}. Note that if j ∈ IN,
then we have that ∗E = E or ∗E′ = E′ as the case may be.
An extended standard mapping that restricts S to internal subsets would re-
strict S to {∗M(Pν∗a(ν)(1)), . . . ,
∗M(Pν∗a(ν)(j))}, whenever j ∈ IN
>0. Such a restric-
tion map models the restriction of S to the natural-world in accordance with the
general interpretation given for internal or finite standard objects (Herrmann, 1993,
p. 98), and the result either directly or indirectly affects the natural-world. This
completes the proof.
In Theorem 2, the force-like ultralogic Pp is very unusual since, although it
satisfies the basic consequence operator properties on internal objects, it does not
seem to correspond to any ordinary form of human deduction for the image of
Pp on
∗{G} = {G} is an internal nonstandard object. Further, the choice of
a specific a ∈ Ap is not an absolutely random choice since the set Ap is a well-
defined mathematical object. Indeed, the process is intuitively the same as the
linguistic process of selecting a representative from the “saying the same thing”
equivalences classes mentioned prior to the statement of Theorem 1. Consequently,
the axiom of choice selection from a given Ap can be considered as but an analogue
to this linguistics process. Further, many predicted probabilities p depend upon a
particular state-of-affairs, a particular scenario. An alteration in the scenario, at any
moment, yields a possible new p. There are NSP-world processes, however, that can
transmit information identifying these alterations “instantaneously,” as perceived
from the natural-world, throughout our entire universe. This might influence the
selection of the appropriate p from a different Ap. For further details see section 11.2
of Herrmann (1993) or the Appendix of Herrmann (1999). In the laboratory setting,
although the probability p may be accurately calculated, the actual event partial
sequence that yields the relative frequencies often seems to be very inaccurate as
an approximator for p. This is readily explained since there are a ∈ Ap such that
gap converges “slowly” to p.
Distributions
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Prior to considering the very important statistical notion of a frequency func-
tion and the distribution it generates, there is need to consider a finite Cartesian
product consequence operator. Suppose that we have a finite set of consequence
operators {C1, . . . ,Cm}, each defined upon its own language Lk and, at the least,
one is axiomless. Define the operator ΠCm as follows: for any X ⊂ L1 × · · · × Lm,
using the projections prk, consider the Cartesian product pr1(X)× · · · × prm(X).
Then ΠCm(X) = C1(pr1(X))×· · ·×Cm(prm(X)) is a consequence operator on sub-
sets of L1 × · · · × Lm. If each Ck is a finitary consequence operator, then ΠCm is
finitary. In all other cases, ΠCm is a general consequence operator. All of these
standard facts also hold within our nonstandard structure under *-transfer.
A distribution’s frequence function is always considered to be the probabilistic
measure that determines the number of events that occur within a cell or “interval”
for a specific decomposition of the events into various definable and disjoint cells.
There is a specific probability that a specific number of events will be contained in
a specific cell and each event must occur in one and only one cell and not occur in
any other cell.
For each distribution over a specific set of cells, Ik, there is a specific proba-
bility pk that an event will occur in cell Ik. Assuming that the distribution does
indeed depict physical behavior, we will have a special collection of gapk sequences
generated. For example, assume that we have three cells and the three probabilities
p1 = 1/4, p2 = 1/2, p3 = 1/4 that events will occupy each of these cells. Assume
that the number of events to occur is 6. Then the three partial sequence might
appear as follows


gap1 = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 2)}
gap2 = {(1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 3)}
gap3 = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0), (5, 1), (6, 1)}
Thus after six events have occurred, 2 events are in the first cell, 3 events are in the
second cell, and only 1 event is in the third cell. Of course, as the number of events
continues the first sequence will converge to 1/4, the second to 1/2 and the third
to 1/4. Obviously for any n ≥ 1, gap1(n) + gap1(n) + gap3(n) = n. Clearly, these
required gapi properties can be generalized to any finite number m of cells. Relative
to each factor of the Cartesian product set, all of the standard aspects of Theorem
2 will hold. Further, these intuitive results are embedded into the above super-
structure and further embedded into our nonstandard structure. Hence, assume
that the languages Lk = L and that the standard consequence operators Ck are
all the same operators used to create a collection of product consequence operators
where each factor is the Capk of Theorem 2. Under the nonstandard embedding,
we would have that for each factor, there is a pure nonstandard consequence oper-
ator Ppk ∈
∗Hk. Finally, consider the product consequence operator ΠPpm . For
∗({G1} × · · · × {Gm}) = {G1} × · · · × {Gm}, Gi = G, this nonstandard prod-
uct consequence operator yields for any fixed event number n, an ordered m-tuple,
where one and only one coordinate would have the statement E (the event occurs)
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and all other coordinates the E′ (the event does not occur). It would be these
m-tuples that guide the proper cell placement for each event and would satisfy the
usual requirements of the distribution. Hence, the patterns produced by a specific
frequency function for a specific distribution may be rationally assumed to be the
result of an application of an ultralogic.
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